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Abstract
The concept of denial has its roots in psychoanalysis. Denial has been assumed to be effective in blocking unwanted memories. In
two experiments, we report that denial has unique consequences for remembering. In our two experiments, participants viewed a
video of a theft, and half of the participants had to deny seeing certain details in the video, whereas the other half had to tell the
truth. One day later, all participants were given either a source-monitoring recognition or a recall task. In these tasks, they were
instructed to indicate (1) whether they could remember talking about certain details and (2) whether they could recollect seeing
those details in the video. In both experiments, we found that denial made participants forget that they had talked about these
details, while leaving memory for the video itself unaffected. This denial-induced forgetting was evident for both the source-
monitoring recognition and recall tests. Furthermore, when we asked participants after the experiment whether they could still not
remember talking about these details, those who had to deny were most likely to report that they had forgotten talking about the
details. In contrast to a widely held belief, we show that denial does not impair memory for the experienced stimuli, but that it has
a unique ability to undermine memory for what has been talked about.
Keywords Denial . Memory . Forgetting . Repression . Deception
Memories are not valued equally: We have a strong desire to
forget certain experiences because of their distressing charac-
teristics. For example, the death of a close relative might lead
to a cascade of emotions that people do not wish to confront.
This type of coping style is thought to be an effective way of
managing the emergence of unpleasant recollections. One
strategy often employed is denial. Denial has been theorized
as a mental operation to block out painful thoughts and emo-
tions. The concept of denial has its historical roots in psycho-
analysis. Regarded as a type of defense mechanism in the
psychodynamic school of thought, it refers to a complete re-
fusal to face certain troubling issues. The concept of denial has
attracted particular attention in the domain of memory, where
it has often been assumed, but not explicitly tested, that
Bmemory may be far more amenable to denial^ (Baumeister,
Dale, & Sommer, p. 1111). In the present two experiments, we
show that denial has the ability to undermine memory in
unique and novel ways.
Denial is sometimes used to deal with trauma. For example,
it is not uncommon for victims of sexual abuse to resort to
using denial to cope by avoiding acknowledgement of the
abuse (Jackson, 2006). The general rationale for this avoid-
ance is that victims of sexual abuse find it difficult to talk
about their abusive experiences. Many do not disclose any
information concerning the traumatic incident(s), and some
victims engage in (falsely) denying that they were abused
even when the abuse has been documented (e.g., Goodman-
Brown, Edelstein, Goodman, Jones, & Gordon, 2003; Lyon,
2007). There are various reasons why victims resort to de-
nial, one of the more obvious ones being shame (Azad &
Leander, 2015). Victims may also be externally pressured
to deny (e.g., coercion from the perpetrator) (Paine &
Hansen, 2002). Importantly, during the course of a well-
conducted forensic interview, an initial denial may shift
into a full disclosure (e.g., Hershkowitz, Orbach, Lamb,
Sternberg, & Horowitz, 2006). Juxtaposed against the fact
that there can be significant time delays between abuse’s
onset and disclosure, a question arises concerning what the
consequences might be of such an initial denial on the
quantity and quality of information that is subsequently
reported. Hence, it is important to examine what effect de-
nial might exert on memory.
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The effects of denial on memory
Empirical research into the mnemonic effects of denial has
been limited. This work has focused mainly on experimenters
instructing participants to deny that an event that they experi-
enced occurred, something that is roughly analogous to a per-
petrator pressuring their victims to deny the experienced
abuse. For example, Vieira and Lane (2013) presented several
pictures (e.g., of an apple) to participants. After this, partici-
pants received labels of studied and unstudied pictures. Under
each label, participants were instructed to repeatedly be truth-
ful by describing the picture or to lie by (falsely) denying that
they had seen the picture. Following a delay of two days, a
sourcememory test was provided to participants in which they
were asked whether or not they had studied a picture and
whether they had lied or told the truth. Participants’ memory
for whether they had studied an item was affected by the type
of memory condition (truth or lie) they had been assigned to in
the rehearsal phase for that item. Specifically, when asked
whether they had studied the items previously, participants
had greater difficulty remembering whether they had studied
an item in the first session if they had later falsely denied
having studied it than if they had to tell the truth about the
studied item. However, this was not strong evidence that for-
getting had occurred, since Vieira and Lane did not find that
false denials led to poorer memory than for items that had not
been rehearsed.
We have recently shown that denials can affect memory in
a unique way (Otgaar, Howe, Memon, &Wang, 2014; Otgaar,
Howe, Smeets, & Wang, 2016). In our experiments, partici-
pants were presented with some stimuli (e.g., a video), and
after this, one group had to deny that certain details had been
presented when in fact they had. After a delay (a day or week),
participants received a source-monitoring recognition test in
which they received the following two questions. First, they
were asked whether they had talked about a certain detail
during the first session. Second, they were asked whether they
could remember seeing that particular detail during the stim-
ulus presentation. As in Vieira and Lane’s (2013) study, mem-
ory for the stimuli was unaffected by the act of denial.
However, more interestingly, in the false-denial group, partic-
ipants were more likely to report that they had not talked about
a certain detail during the first session, when in fact they had.
In a sense, they Bforgot^ that they had denied seeing a certain
detail during the first session. This effect has been called de-
nial-induced forgetting.
What makes this effect so intriguing and different is that in
contrast to other forgetting phenomena, such as directed for-
getting or retrieval-induced forgetting, the present effect is not
related to the forgetting of encoded stimuli. That is, denial-
induced forgetting pertains to an effect in which participants
are unable to recollect that they talked about a certain detail
during the first interview session. This implies that the act of
denial adversely impacts recollection of that denial at the very
time the denial is being issued. Also, the effect seems to be
robust, since it has been shown in children and adults (Otgaar,
Howe, et al., 2014), using different stimuli (pictures and
videos; Otgaar et al., 2016), using different retention intervals
(one day and one week; Otgaar, Howe, et al., 2014; Otgaar
et al., 2016), and for neutral and emotionally negative stimuli
(Otgaar et al., 2016). Furthermore, previous experimentation
has ruled out the possibility that the effect was caused by a
lack of confidence or processing of the items at the time of the
denial (Otgaar et al., 2016).
From a practical perspective, the phenomenon of denial-
induced forgetting might be relevant in the context of the
reliability of the memory of victims (and eyewitnesses). That
is, victims of abuse are sometimes interviewed repeatedly.
When, during the first interview, they (falsely) deny having
experienced certain abuse-related details and then during a
subsequent interview Bforget^ what they talked about during
the first interview, their statements might appear inconsistent.
Why this is relevant is because legal professionals often false-
ly assume that such inconsistent statements are unreliable, and
as such, victims might have the appearance of being unreli-
able. The consequence could ultimately be that their state-
ments will not be taken seriously in the courtroom (e.g.,
Smeets, Candel, & Merckelbach, 2004).
What we do not know at present is the extent of this phe-
nomenon and whether denial-induced forgetting can be de-
tected in other memory tasks. That is, previous research has
employed a rather simple source-monitoring test. Specifically,
previous participants had to recognize whether they remem-
bered certain stimuli and whether they had also talked about
these stimuli. From a purely theoretical stance, it is relevant to
assess whether this effect can be generalized to other memory
processes such as recall. The relationship between recall and
recognition has a long history in psychology (e.g., J. R.
Anderson & Bower, 1972, 1974; Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984;
Haist, Shimamura, & Squire, 1992). The general finding is
that recognition is easier than and superior to recall. Indeed,
traditional theories postulated that recall requires more mem-
ory strength for a response than does recognition (McDougall,
1904) and that recognition is often based purely on familiarity
judgments (J. R. Anderson & Bower, 1973). Following these
theoretical principles, the basic tenet became that recall entails
more extensive reinstatement of an encoded event than does
recognition (e.g., Craik, 2002; Lockhart, Craik, & Jacoby,
1976).
So, a more stringent test of whether denial leads to forget-
ting would be to investigate the effects of denial on both recall
and recognition. If denial has a strong adverse impact on
memory, it would lead to memory undermining effects in re-
call, as well. Examining this is all the more relevant because
certain memory phenomena are found only for recognition
and not for recall. For example, a consistent pattern in the
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false-memory literature is that false recognition is evoked
more easily for emotionally negative than for neutral material.
This pattern, however, is not found for recall (Howe, Candel,
Otgaar, Malone, &Wimmer, 2010). On the other hand, certain
robust memory phenomena, such as retrieval-induced forget-
ting, are found for both recall and recognition (e.g., Gómez-
Ariza, Lechuga, Pelegrina, & Bajo, 2005).
The examination of the effect of denial on memory recall
and recognition is also relevant from a theoretical perspective.
Recently, a memory-and-deception (MAD) model has been
proposed to explain the effects of different types of deception
on memory (Otgaar & Baker, 2018). According to MAD,
denial can be seen as a form of deception. Specifically,
MAD proposes that the memory deterioration effect of denial
is caused by the fact that the act of denial monopolizes cogni-
tive resources. Because of this, participants are less likely to
rehearse what they have denied, leading to forgetting effects.
If true, the lack of rehearsal would lead to forgetting effects
not only in recognition tasks, but also in recall tasks. Also,
from a practical perspective, examining denial-induced forget-
ting in recall tasks is warranted. For example, in many inter-
view settings, victims who initially deny that an event has
taken place are frequently given follow-up, open-ended ques-
tions that target recall memory (Lamb et al., 2007).
The present experiments
In the present experiments, participants had to view a video of
a theft, and half of the participants had to deny that they saw
certain details present in the video. One day later, half of the
participants received the usual source-monitoring task, where-
as the other half received a recall task. In the recall task, the
participants were instructed to recall as many details as they
could that they had talked about during the first session.
Furthermore, they were asked to recall as many details as they
could from the video. As an exploratory aim, participants were
also asked to rate their belief in, and memory for, items that
were mentioned during the memory tests (Otgaar, Scoboria, &
Mazzoni, 2014). Our main prediction was that denial-induced
forgetting would be found for both the source-monitoring rec-
ognition and recall tasks.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
On the basis of an a priori power analysis (G*Power; Faul,
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) with a power of .80 and a
medium effect size for the difference between the false-denial
and control groups (f = 0.25), a total sample size of 90 was
needed. The present study used a total sample size of 87 (mean
age = 22.38, SD = 5.98, range 17–59; 69 women, 18 men).
Participants were recruited by means of advertisements posted
at Maastricht University. After participating, each person re-
ceived compensation for their time (e.g., participant points or
a voucher).
Materials
Video We used a video that has been used in our previous
work (Otgaar, Howe, et al., 2014; Otgaar et al., 2016) as well
as in other memory studies (Takarangi, Parker, & Garry,
2006). The video is called BEric the Electrician.^ In the video,
Eric enters a house and steals several items (e.g., jewelry, CD)
in that house. The duration of the video is 6.5 min.1
Design and procedure
We used a between-subjects design in which participants were
randomly assigned to one of four conditions (denial–source
monitoring, denial–free recall, control–source monitoring,
and control–free recall). The present experiment comprised
two sessions separated by a one-day interval. The first session
contained two testing moments, and the second session
contained one testing moment. In the control group, partici-
pants were asked to answer the questions that were asked as
honestly as possible. During the second session, half of the
participants were asked to take part in a source-monitoring
recognition task (yes/no questions), and half of the partici-
pants were asked to take part in a free-recall task. In the denial
group, participants were asked to (falsely) deny having seen
certain details in the video during the first session. For in-
stance, when asked what vehicle Eric arrived with, the partic-
ipant was required to say that Eric did not arrive with a vehi-
cle. In the second session, the same partition was made as in
the control condition: Half of the participants took part in a
source-monitoring recognition task (yes/no questions), and
the other half was asked to take part in a free-recall task.
Session 1 All participants first viewed a video of Eric the
electrician, after which they engaged in the first distractor task
(Tetris, to prevent rehearsal of the information) for 5 min.
They then completed a memory test that contained ten items
about details that had been present in the video (true questions:
e.g., BWhere did Eric find the key^?). After each item, partic-
ipants had to indicate their memory and belief for the item
(belief: 1 = definitely did not happen, 8 = definitely did
happen; memory: 1 = no memory at all, 8 = clear and com-
plete memory; Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Relyea, 2004).
1 All materials and data sets (analyses and syntax) can be found at https://osf.
io/vy5tm/.
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Then they engaged in the second distractor task (Bubble
Shooter) for 5 min. Following this, participants received a
second memory test. Specifically, the participants in the con-
trol conditions were instructed to answer honestly and without
guessing (e.g., BWhat kind of vehicle did Eric arrive with?^
Correct response: a van), and the participants in the denial
conditions were instructed to deny in response to every ques-
tion (e.g., BWhat kind of vehicle did Eric arrive with?^Correct
response: Eric did not arrive with a vehicle). This task
consisted of 12 questions, of which eight were true (and were
also asked on the first memory test) and four concerned details
that were not shown in the video.2 Importantly, the partici-
pants in the denial condition were corrected if they did not
provide a denial as instructed. For example, if a participant
stated BEric did not arrive with anything,^ he or she was told
how to deny by using an example, to make sure every partic-
ipant came up with the same denial (e.g., BEric did not arrive
with a vehicle^).
Session 2 One day later, the participants in the source-
monitoring conditions were asked to complete the source-
monitoring recognition task. During this task, participants
were asked to answer 16 items (ten true—five apiece asked
about the first and second memory tests—and six false) that
each contained two questions. The first question referred to
whether the participant had talked about these details during
the interviews in Session 1. The second question referred to
whether the participant had seen certain details during the
video. Both questions should be answered with a Byes^ or
Bno.^ True details referred to details that had been present in
the video, whereas false details had not been present in the
video. After each item, participants were asked to indicate
their memory and belief for the item. Participants in the free
recall conditions were asked to write down as many details as
they could remember from the interview first, and then from
the video. They also had to indicate their memory and belief
strength (belief: 1 = definitely did not happen, 8 = definitely
did happen; memory: 1 = no memory at all, 8 = clear and
complete memory) for every detail they wrote down. At the
end of the experiment, all participants received a debriefing.
Results and discussion
Baseline memory performance
To examine whether participants were able to accurately rec-
ollect details from the video, we calculated the overall mean
baseline memory performance across groups. The overall
mean proportion baseline memory performance across groups
was .76 (SD = .16), suggesting that the video was not too
difficult and complex for participants. To examine whether
the various groups differed in terms of their memory perfor-
mance before half of the participants had to deny some details,
a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on
the performance on the first memory test. The groups did not
differ statistically in terms of memory performance, F(3, 83) =
0.49, p = .69, ηp
2 = .02.
Memory effects of denial
The most important analyses focused on whether the act of
denial can lead to memory-undermining effects for both
(source-monitoring) recognition and recall. Importantly, be-
cause recall and recognition are measured differently, we used
separate independent-samples t tests to investigate the effects
of denial on recognition and recall. To start, we analyzed the
effect of denial on the recognition of details that were talked
about during the memory tests. As expected, we found evi-
dence for a denial-induced forgetting effect, t(41) = 3.27, p =
.002, d = 0.99, 95% CI [0.05, 0.99]. That is, the participants in
the denial group (Mprop = .78, SD = .09) were less likely to
remember that they had talked about details presented during
the memory tests, when in fact they had, than were the partic-
ipants in the control group (Mprop = .91, SD = .15; Fig. 1). To
examine whether our denial-induced forgetting effect would
also appear using alternative statistical tests, we conducted a
Bayesian analysis. A Bayes factor10 of 16.50 with a prior of
0.71 was also found, which means that our data were more in
favor of the alternative hypothesis (= a difference between the
two groups) than the null hypothesis (= no difference between
the groups). We performed the same analyses on false details
that were mentioned during the interviews. No statistical dif-
ferences emerged between the two groups, t(42) = – 1.78, p =
.08.We also looked at whether denying seeing details affected
memory for the video. No statistical difference was found
between the two groups when looking at the presented details,
t(41) = – 0.73, p = .47. Similarly, no effect was likewise found
when focusing on the false details, t(41) = – 0.97, p = .34.
The next question was whether a denial-induced forgetting
effect would be found when looking at the recall data. When
focusing on the average number of details that were discussed
during Session 1, we found some support for the denial-
induced effect for false details, t(35.01) = 3.03, p = .005, in
that the denial group (M = 0.52, SD = 0.60) forgot having
denied these details the day before more than did the control
group (M = 1.27, SD = 0.98). A Bayes factor10 of 8.93 with a
prior of 0.71 was found for this result, which indicates that our
data are again more in favor of the alternative than of the null
hypothesis. However, no effect of denial on true recall was
observed, t(41) = – 0.60, p = .55. Analyses on the recall data
for details that had been seen in the video revealed a consistent
2 Our experiment used a procedure similar to that in previous work on denial-
induced forgetting. Because in the first study on this effect (Otgaar, Howe,
et al., 2014) wewere also interested in false memories, false details were added
in the memory tests. Hence, these false details were also present in the present
experiments.
Mem Cogn
pattern. No denial-induced forgetting was revealed for either
true, t(41) = – 0.96, p = .34, or false, t(41) = – 0.23, p = .82,
recall.
Exploratory analyses
Belief and memoryWe also conducted some exploratory anal-
yses on the belief and memory rating data. A one-way
ANOVA on the belief and memory ratings between the denial
and control groups for the first memory test did not reveal any
statistically significant effects [belief: F(3, 83) = 1.35, p = .26;
memory: F(3, 83) = 0.79, p = .50]. For items addressed on the
source-monitoring test, no statistical difference emerged be-
tween the denial and control groups for all measures (i.e., true,
false items) for either belief or memory, ts < 1.21. For the
recall data, again no statistical differences emerged for either
the belief or the memory data, ts < 2.00.
Issues with recall data On the basis of the analyses described
so far, one might conclude that we replicated the denial-
induced forgetting effect for source-monitoring recognition
and also found evidence for this effect in the recall data.
However, in retrospect we realized that the groups that re-
ceived a recall task differed in many ways from the recogni-
tion groups. First, the participants who were presented with
the source-monitoring recognition task received the questions
orally, but the participants who received the recall task had to
write the items that they could still recollect. Second, and
more importantly, the participants who received the recall task
were not given any time limit, whereas those presented with
the source-monitoring recognition task had a fixed-duration
task. This second difference was particularly problematic be-
cause the participants in the recall groups had more time to
think about all of the items, and this could have masked any
potential recall difference between the denial and control
groups.
Indeed, when we looked at the distribution of the recall
data, we saw that 41.8% (n = 18) of the participants came up
with details in the second half of their recall attempt, but only
9.3% (n = 4) recollected details in the first half. This implies
that the additional time resulted in most participants
recollecting the details toward the end. Hence, to remedy this
issue and the issue that the recall and source-monitoring rec-
ognition tasks were administered differently, we conducted a
second experiment in which we improved our methodology.
That is, the participants in both the recall and source-
monitoring recognition tasks had to complete the tasks by
writing down their responses during Session 2. Furthermore,
in Experiment 2 a time limit was introduced for the memory
tests.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 (i.e., similar
design and material), except for what happened during
Session 2.
Method
Participants
On the basis of an a priori power analysis (G*Power; Faul
et al., 2007) with a power of .80 and a medium effect size
for the difference between the denial and control groups (f =
0.25), a total sample size of 90 was needed. In Experiment 2,
100 participants (mean age = 21.23, SD = 3.63, range 18–44;
89 women, 11 men) were tested. As in Experiment 1, partic-
ipants were acquired by means of advertisement at Maastricht
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Fig. 1 Experiment 1: Raw numbers of Byes^ responses that participants provided on the source-monitoring recognition task between the denial and
control groups (error bars represent 95% confidence intervals).
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University. After participating, they received a compensation
for their time (e.g., participant points or a voucher).
Design and procedure
The difference between Experiments 1 and 2 occurred during
Session 2. That is, in this experiment we imposed a time limit
during the recall and recognition tasks. On the second day of
the study (24 h later), the participants in the source-monitoring
conditions were asked to complete the source-monitoring task
themselves. During this task, participants were asked to com-
plete the task using the same items and questions as in
Experiment 1. Furthermore, they were not only asked whether
they were able to remember whether they had seen a certain
detail in the video, they also had to come up with that detail.
For instance, when participants were asked the question
BWhen watching the video, did you see what vehicle Eric
arrived with?,^ participants were expected to answer with
Byes,^ but they were also expected to write down the vehicle
(in this case, Ba van^). Also, participants had to indicate their
memory and belief about the detail the question referred to
(belief: 1 = definitely did not happen, 8 = definitely did
happen; memory: 1 = no memory at all, 8 = clear and com-
plete memory).
The participants in the free-recall conditions received the
same task as in Experiment 1. However, a time limit of
7.5 min was now used in the free-recall conditions. The re-
search assistant of this experiment (third author) estimated the
time that was needed to complete the source monitoring, and
this time limit was used for the recall task as well. This time
limit was added in order to make the free-recall and source-
monitoring conditions more alike with regard to the time
needed to complete the task. After this task, some additional
exit interview questions were directly posed. These questions
concerned the details that had been remembered and talked
about during the first session, but that had not been reported in
the second session. The experimenter confronted the partici-
pants with the fact that they had not reported a certain detail
that they had talked about the day before. The experimenter
then asked them whether they really did not remember talking
about this particular detail. If the participant stated that he or
she did not remember the detail, the experimenter asked why
the participant thought he or she did not remember talking
about that detail. At the end of the experiment, all participants
received a debriefing.
Results and discussion
Baseline memory performance
The overall mean proportion baseline memory performance
across groups was .77 (SD = .15). As in Experiment 1, the
groups did not differ statistically in terms of their initial mem-
ory performance, F(3, 96) = 1.27, p = .29, ηp
2 = .04.
Memory effects of denial
Again, we found support for a denial-induced forgetting effect
for true details, t(48) = 7.77, p < .001, d = 2.20, 95%CI [0.13,
0.22], with the experimental group (Mprop = .77, SD = .09)
denying having talked about certain details more than the
control group did (Mprop = .94, SD = .071) (Fig. 2). A Bayes
factor10 of 12.84 with a prior of 0.71 was also detected. As in
Experiment 1, this effect did not appear for the false details,
t(48) = 0.62, p = .54. For the recall data, a denial-induced
forgetting effect was detected as well for the true details,
t(48) = 3.19, p = .002, d = 0.90, 95%CI [0.79, 3.45], Bayes
factor10 = 14.70. Specifically, the participants in the denial
group (M = 8.24, SD = 2.09) recalled fewer details that had
been talked about than did the participants in the control group
(M = 10.36, SD = 2.58; Fig. 3). This effect also emerged for
the false details, t(48) = 5.96, p < .001, d = 1.69, 95%CI [1.06,
2.14], Bayes factor10 = 39,880 (control group:M = 1.92, SD =
1.22; denial group:M = 0.32, SD = 0.56). Again, no effect of
denial was found onmemory for the video for either true, t(48)
= 0.88, p = .38, or false, t(48) = – 0.22, p = .83, details.
Exploratory analyses
Belief and memory A one-way ANOVA on the belief and
recollection data for the first memory test between the differ-
ent groups did not demonstrate any statistically significant
effects [belief: F(3, 96) = 0.88, p = .46; memory: F(3, 96) =
0.75, p = .53]. For items addressed on the source-monitoring
and recall tests, no statistical differences emerged between the
denial and control groups for all measures (i.e., true items
[video and interview], false items [video and interview]) for
either belief or memory, ts < 1.34.
Exit interview To explore whether participants really did not
remember talking about certain details, even when told that
they had reported a detail during the first session, we conduct-
ed an analysis on the responses of participants directly after
the experiment. The answers were in response to questions
about the details that had been remembered and talked about
during the first session, but that had not been reported in the
second session. Participants’ responses were categorized into
four groups: 1 = no answer, 2 = remembers it again, 3 = does
not remember it again, 4 = vague memory. A Fisher’s exact
test was performed on the distribution of these group scores.
We found a statistically significant effect (Fisher exact test =
80.98, p < .001, Cramér’s V = .49), showing that the control
group was more likely to give no answer (n = 46), whereas the
participants in the denial group were more likely to say that
they could not remember the detail anymore (n = 30). This
Mem Cogn
suggests that even when the participants were confronted with
the fact they had talked about certain details during the first
session, they responded that they could not remember it any-
more. Together with the aforementioned denial-induced for-
getting results, this provides additional evidence that denial
leads to the forgetting of material that has been discussed.
General discussion
It has been well-documented that people sometimes employ
the strategy of denial in order to avoid the acknowledgment of
unpleasant issues or experiences. By doing so, unwanted
memories are assumed to be less accessible, and hence not
as likely to be retrieved. In the present line of investigation,
we tested this purported effect of denial on memory perfor-
mance. We found strong support that denial leads to a special
form of forgetting. Specifically, in two experiments we
showed that denial did not make people forget the details that
they had experienced, but it did make them forget that they
had talked about certain details. This denial-induced forgetting
effect was demonstrated for both source-monitoring recogni-
tion and recall tests.
In both experiments, participants viewed a video of a theft
and were asked several questions related to the video. After
this, half of the participants had to deny that they had seen
certain details, whereas the other half had to tell the truth. One
day later, participants were asked about their memory for de-
tails of the video and about their memory for details that had
been discussed during the interview. Half of the participants
were involved in a source-monitoring recognition test, where-
as the others received a recall task. In both experiments we
found that when asked about their memory of the interview,
the denial group forgot having talked about these details,
whereas in fact, they had. Furthermore, this forgetting effect
was only directed at the memory for the interview, since
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Fig. 2 Experiment 2: Raw numbers of Byes^ responses that participants provided on the source-monitoring recognition task between the denial and
control groups (error bars represent 95% confidence intervals).
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Fig. 3 Experiment 2: Numbers of correctly recalled details between the denial and control groups (error bars represent 95% confidence intervals).
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memory for the video was unaffected by the act of denial.
Equally interesting, in most of the analyses in which we have
found denial-induced forgetting (n = 3, 60%), we found that
this denial-induced forgetting occurred especially for true de-
tails. This could mean the following. First, it shows that de-
mand characteristics are unlikely to have played a role, since
one could argue that denial-induced forgetting should then
have been present for all types of details (true and false).
Second, this result might imply that participants were aware
that the false details were false, thereby making them more
distinctive. If so, it might be that because of the increased
distinctiveness of false details, it would be difficult to create
memory-undermining effects by means of denying them. Of
course, this is an issue that awaits future empirical scrutiny.
What makes this forgetting effect so remarkable is that it
deviates from other well-known forgetting effects in the mem-
ory literature, such as retrieval-induced forgetting, directed
forgetting, and retrieval suppression (e.g., Hu, Bergström,
Gagnepain, & Anderson, 2017; MacLeod, 1999; Murayama,
Miyatsu, Buchli, & Storm, 2014). For the latter effects, people
are instructed to forget certain stimuli or to Bnot think^ about
certain material. The standard finding is that memory for these
stimuli is impaired as a result of the instructions. This, how-
ever, is not what happens during denial-induced forgetting.
Memory for the stimuli is not affected, but memory for the
details about denying that these stimuli were seen earlier (as
was discussed during a subsequent interview) is compro-
mised. As far as we know, such a forgetting effect is quite
unique in the memory literature.
The only forgetting effect that seems to be roughly related
to our denial-induced forgetting effect is the forget-it-all-along
effect (Arnold & Lindsay, 2002; Schooler, Bendiksen, &
Ambadar, 1997). The latter effect refers to the finding that
people forget prior instances of remembering when past
events are remembered in different ways on separate occa-
sions. Although there are similarities between the two effects,
in denial-induced forgetting, people forget having denied and
do not forget having remembered. Of course, similar mecha-
nisms might play a role here, and this would be an interesting
area for future research.
Another impetus of the present experiments was to assess
whether the act of denial led to forgetting in different memory
tasks. Previous studies have only focused on the effect of
denial on source monitoring (Otgaar, Howe, et al., 2014;
Otgaar et al., 2016). In the present experiments, we included
two ways to test memory—namely, by using a source-
monitoring recognition and a free-recall task. Our reasoning
was that denial would only have strong memory-undermining
effects if such effects were observed in both memory tests.
What we found was that denial-induced forgetting occurred
on both memory tasks. Although in Experiment 1 this forget-
ting effect was not that straightforward for the recall data, we
argued that the groups that received the source-monitoring
recognition or recall tasks differed in many aspects (e.g., in
the time allotted for retrieval), and that this could have affected
the results. When-we corrected these issues, we obtained clear
evidence that denial undermined memory in both the source
monitoring recognition and recall tasks. This finding is so
important because recall has been shown to be more effortful,
and hence more demanding, than recognition (J. R. Anderson
& Bower, 1972, 1974; Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Haist et al.,
1992). Finding that denial impairs both source-monitoring
recognition and recall strengthens the idea that denial can
result in forgetting. Alternatively, when we imposed a time
limit on the participants in Experiment 2, no forgetting took
place, but participants had less time to retrieve the items that
had been memorized. However, when we asked participants
whether they truly did not remember talking about these de-
tails, the participants in the denial group were most likely to
indicate that they still could not recollect talking about the
details. All in all, this strengthens our idea that denial leads
to actual forgetting. Of course, this exit interview happened
directly after the memory test; hence, it is unclear whether this
forgetting effect would also occur after a delay. Prospective
research might dig into this issue.
Inhibition has been proposed to underlie the memory de-
terioration effects found in retrieval suppression or retrieval-
induced forgetting (M. C. Anderson & Green, 2001;
Murayama et al., 2014). The idea behind this hypothesis is
that inhibitory control mechanisms prevent memories that
are unwanted from popping up during retrieval. It is likely
that such inhibitory control also occurs during denial-
induced forgetting. In the present experiments, when people
were instructed to deny having seen certain details, the act of
denial of those particular details might have inhibited the
memory of talking about those details during the interview.
As a result, when participants had to remember talking about
those details, the participants who had to deny were less able
to retrieve the memory of the interview than were the control
participants.
An equally interesting explanation would be to regard de-
nial as a simple form of deception. That is, when participants
were instructed to deny, most of the time they were denying
seeing certain true details, which can be seen as lying. This is
important to note, because lying requires cognitive resources
(Otgaar & Baker, 2018; Vrij & Heaven, 1999; Walczyk,
Harris, Duck, & Mulay, 2014). If this reasoning is applied to
the present experiments, the result is that when participants
had to deny a detail, fewer resources were available to mem-
orize the details that had been talked about during the inter-
view. Therefore, the participants in the denial group had im-
paired memory for the Bdenial^ interview at a follow-up in-
terview. This interpretation would be well in line with the
MAD framework, which suggests that the act of deception
engages cognitive resources and that the use of such resources
might affect memory performance (Otgaar & Baker, 2018).
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Alternatively, our results parallel research on themnemonic
effects of feigning amnesia. In this line of research, partici-
pants are involved in a mock crime, and one group has to feign
amnesia for the crime. What has been found in these studies is
that when instructed to tell the truth, the feigners omit details
that they experienced, relative to nonfeigners (e.g., van
Oorsouw & Merckelbach, 2006). These effects have been
interpreted in terms of a lack of rehearsal when participants
feign amnesia. Specifically, the rationale is that when simulat-
ing amnesia, participants rehearse the experienced event less
well and less efficiently, leading to memory-undermining ef-
fects of the experienced event. The same might occur during
denial-induced forgetting. Of course, the present experiments
were designed to examine whether denial truly leads to some
form of forgetting, and the goal was not to assess the mecha-
nisms behind denial-induced forgetting. Future experiments
could examine this proposed mechanism of cognitive re-
sources by adding an extra group in which resources are de-
pleted as well, but for reasons other than denial (e.g., a
divided-attention group).
Denial has often been conceptualized as a strategy to deal
with unpleasant experiences, thereby making traumatic mem-
ories less likely to be accessed. In this regard, denial has its
roots in psychoanalysis and has much overlap with the repres-
sion (Baumeister, Dale, & Sommer, 1998). Although our re-
sults have shown that denial undermines memory, they should
by no means be interpreted as evidence for denial being an
efficient means to block out (traumatic) memories. Indeed, we
found no evidence whatsoever that denial impacted the recol-
lection of the stimuli themselves. So, in line with previous
critiques of the use of repression (e.g., Lindsay & Read,
1994; Loftus, 1994), the present studies add that it is unlikely
that denial can be used to suppress traumatic memories.
Instead, our studies illustrate a different role for the effects
of denial on memory—namely, that it affects recollection of
the denial itself, but not of the stimulus that was the target of
the denial. Of course, it must be noted here that the stimuli
used in the present experiments are a far cry from the traumat-
ic experiences that child abuse victims face, and hence, an
empirical question is whether our results would be reproduced
when using more negative stimuli than the ones that have been
used here and in previous work (Otgaar et al., 2016).
To summarize, in the present experiments we examined the
effects of denial on memory. In two experiments, we showed
that denial impaired memory on source-monitoring recogni-
tion and recall tests. Specifically, we found that denial made
participants forget having talked about denying the presence
of certain details seen in an earlier video. Since our findings
did not show any effects of denial on the memory for the
stimuli themselves, denial seems to lead to a unique form of
forgetting in both recall and recognition, which to our knowl-
edge has not been previously demonstrated in the psycholog-
ical literature.
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